ABSTRACT Sparse code multiple access (SCMA) is a promising candidate air interface of next-generation mobile networks. In this paper, we focus on a downlink SCMA system where a transmitter sends confidential messages to multiple users in the presence of external eavesdroppers. Consequently, we develop a novel secure transmission approach over physical layer based on a highly structured SCMA codebook design. In our proposed scheme, we rotate the base constellations (BCs) with random angles by extracting channel phases from the channel state information. By employing randomized constellation rotation, the security of downlink SCMA can be ensured. In addition, a tight SCMA upper bound is introduced to guide the design of the encrypted codebook. As a result, we propose an approach to avoid the significant error rate performance loss caused by using codebooks that are designed using our method. The proposed upper-bound-aided codebook design scheme can select relatively good codebooks with low complexity. By combining SCMA codebook design and secure communication, our scheme ensures security for massive quantities of users with low encrypted and decrypted complexity at the cost of transmission rate and possible error rate performance loss. Moreover, the proposed scheme can achieve robustness against channel estimation errors. Analyses and Monte Carlo simulations confirm the effectiveness of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the commercialization of 4th generation (4G) mobile networks, researchers have focused on the new air-interface technology, which is more efficient and reliable, to meet the demands of the 5th generation (5G) mobile networks [1] . To further increase the spectral efficiency, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is proposed as a supplement to conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA). Sparse code multiple access (SCMA) [2] is a code domain NOMA that is considered to be a promising 5G candidate due to its excellent ability to support massive quantities of users under heavily loaded conditions. 1 In the possible application scenarios for NOMA, such as massive machine type of communication (mMTC), millions 1 Overloading is referred to as the case where the number of users supported by the system is greater than the number of OFDMA subcarriers. of nodes must be accessed. Owing to the demands of ultra low latency and low power consumption for the internet of things (IoT), it is challenging to ensure the security in such a huge network. Hence, new secure transmission approaches that are adapted to NOMA should be considered. In this paper, we focus on designing a secure transmission scheme for a downlink SCMA system.
The concept of physical layer security (PLS) was initially proposed by Wyner from an information theoretical perspective [3] . In recent years, PLS research has mainly focused on the practical perspective [4] - [11] . It should be noted that PLS does not compete with traditional cryptographic technologies that are based on high computational complexity. The former has complementary features and can be utilized to further enhance the security level of existing communication systems from the physical layer, which is independent of the higher layers.
The first NOMA scheme was defined on the power domain, and its secrecy outage probability was derived in [12] and [13] . As the authors noted, the secrecy performance of power-domain NOMA networks is related to the scope of the protected zone and user zone. In [14] , a secure transmission scheme that maximized the minimum confidential information rate among users subject to the secrecy outage probability and transmitted power constraints was proposed. In contrast to power-domain NOMA, SCMA is a code-domain NOMA scheme that uses the low-density signature (LDS) technique. To achieve better error rate performance, Taherzadeh et al. [15] proposed shaping gain through rotating the constellation points with a unitary angle in the codebook design. Compared with OMA, NOMA has greater ability to achieve overall multi-user capacity by allowing overlap in specific dimensions.
Several PLS studies apply rotation to ensure the security of communication without loss of secrecy capacity [16] . Chen et al. [17] proposed rotation of the original symbols with random phases in a massive MIMO system to protect against eavesdroppers with a large number of antennas. A method for encrypting the modulation by simultaneously changing the amplitudes and phases on the constellation was proposed in [18] .
Inspired by the highly structured SCMA codebook, we combine constellation rotation and secure transmission of SCMA to produce a randomized constellation-rotationbased SCMA (RCR-SCMA) scheme. Our proposed scheme is conceived to support downlink communications in heavily loaded environments with superior security. In summary, the novelties of the paper are as follows:
• An RCR-SCMA scheme is proposed for secure transmission in a downlink SCMA system. Aiming to ensure the security of massive quantities of users, we introduce the RCR into the design of SCMA codebooks to protect confidential information with low encrypted complexity. Although several works on conventional SCMA codebook design have been proposed [19] - [21] , they mainly focus on improving the error rate performance: none discuss the feasibility of using SCMA codebooks to ensure security. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a secure SCMA transmission scheme that combines RCR and codebook design.
• The idea behind RCR-SCMA is that legitimate users (LUs) and eavesdroppers have asymmetry knowledge about the channel; therefore, channel key generation [22] - [24] can also be applied in our proposed scheme. 2 Because RCR is utilized, RCR-SCMA may result in performance loss compared with the conventional SCMA codebook in [15] . To minimize the performance loss, we design the codebook according to the tight upper bound in [25] . Consequently, we introduce a parameter to roughly estimate the performance of encrypted codebooks with low computational complex- 2 In this paper, we propose to encrypt the codebook by using the channel phase that extracting from CSI. It should be noted that other channel key generation techniques are also applicable. However, the discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper ity. This method is useful in designing an RCR-SCMA codebook with acceptable performance loss. As far as we know, no such upper-bound-aided codebook design has been proposed.
• To investigate the security and reliability of
RCR-SCMA, we analyze the impact of imperfect channel estimation. Monte Carlo simulations and derived formulas both show that RCR-SCMA can achieve robustness against imperfect channel estimation under certain conditions. Moreover, based on the features of the message passing algorithm (MPA), we find that the security of conventional SCMA is strongly related to the proposed insecure rotated angle (IRA). Further analysis shows that conventional SCMA has poor secrecy performance, even though the codebook is unknown to the eavesdropper. The parameters that influence the IRA are derived from both simulation results and deduced formulas. The decrypted complexity and two possible attack models of RCR-SCMA are also analyzed to highlight its high security. Such a systematic analysis on the security of SCMA has not been reported previously. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce downlink SCMA. The RCR-SCMA codebook design scheme is proposed in Section III. Section IV presents the step-by-step process of transmitting a block in RCR-SCMA. The simulation results and secrecy analysis are discussed in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Section VII concludes this paper. 
II. SPARSE CODE MULTIPLE ACCESS
A brief introduction of downlink SCMA and the detection algorithm based on the message passing algorithm (MPA) at the receiver is presented in this section.
A downlink SCMA system where a base station (BS) communicates with J users is depicted in Fig. 1 . For the jth user, every m = log 2 (M ) bits of user j directly map to a K -dimensional SCMA codeword, where M denotes the constellation size. For simplicity, the codeword of the jth user is denoted as c j = [c elements in each column.
f j,k = 1 denotes that the jth user is spread by the kth chip. Due to the sparsity of F K ×J , SCMA can also be represented by a Tanner graph [26] .
For a conventional SCMA system with 4 chips and 6 users,, the indicator matrix can be represented as: 
The non-zero elements in F 4×6 represent the connection between user nodes and chip nodes, which indicate that the jth user is spread by the kth chip. We assume that the numbers of non-zeros in each column and each row are the same. Therefore, the received signal at BS can be written as:
where diag(h j ) is a diagonal matrix, vector c j is the SCMA codeword of the jth user,
T is the channel gain between user j and the transmitter, and z is Gaussian noise with variance δ 2 .
Due to the sparsity of the indicator matrix in (1), MPA can be utilized as a detection algorithm at the receiver. The logarithm domain MPA, which is denoted as Max-Log (ML), for SCMA detection is given in Algorithm 1. Initialization:
for k = 1 : K do 5: for j = 1 : d u do 6: 
end for 9: end for 10:
end for 12: Chip nodes update:
13:
User nodes update:
14:
Decision: 
III. RCR-SCMA CODEBOOK DESIGN
The RCR-SCMA codebook design and its upper bound are developed in this section.
A. SYSTEM MODEL It can be inferred that when the codebooks of the transmitter and eavedroppers do not match, the eavesdroppers cannot receive the correct information. As a result, if the base station (BS) and the users share a codebook that the eavesdroppers cannot obtain, the communication security between the BS and LUs can be ensured. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to design codebooks with the following characteristics: (1) high security with low encrypted and decrypted complexity compare to conventional cryptographic technologies; and (2) lower error rate performance loss that will not significantly cinfluence the reliability of SCMA under overloading conditions.
Taking the 4-point RCR-SCMA as an example, the process of the encrypted codebook design is shown in Fig. 2 . A pair of random angles (θ
2 ), i = 1, 2 is used to rotate the original base constellations (BCs), where θ
The received signals at the jth user's receiver can be written as:
where E(c j , θ
2 ) is the encrypted RCR-SCMA codeword, which can be regarded as a function of c j , θ At the receiver's side, the LUs use the rotated codebook to detect the information; hence, the calculation of L c [β] in Algorithm 1 can be rewritten as
Note that θ 
2 are unknown to the eavesdroppers because the rotated angles are changed based on the CSI, which varies independently over time. Moreover, as the CSI is a distant-independent parameter, it is almost impossible for eavesdroppers to predict it. Therefore, the eavesdropper
2 ) to detect the data. Consequently, L c [β] cannot be calculated correctly, which indicates that the initial message to process MPA is incorrect.
B. RCR-BASED ENCRYPTED CODEBOOK DESIGN
To maximize the minimum product distance, a unitary rotation of base constellation (BC) is utilized in conventional VOLUME 6, 2018 SCMA codebook design. For the sake of designing a codebook to ensure security, we propose randomization the rotation of each point on the BCs rather than the fixed angle rotation in conventional SCMA. Such a method can protect confidential data at the cost of possible performance loss. In contrast to conventional SCMA codebook design, each constellation point on the BC corresponds to an independent rotation angle in RCR-SCMA. Considering the 16-point codebook design, the rotation of each constellation point can be expressed as:
where (x i , y i ) is the original coordinate of each point on the BC; (X i , Y i ) is the coordinate after rotating each point on the BC; (d
and R i is the rotation matrix, which can be denoted as:
The BC in 16-point RCR-SCMA after rotation using our scheme is shown in Fig. 3 . As depicted in Fig. 3 , each BC applies a different rotation to generate the encrypted MCs. Such operations aim to enhance the security. According to (5) , d As a result, the shuffling in RCR-SCMA codebook design is different from that of conventional SCMA. For convenience, we define two sets as follws:
where N is a set that depends on the log 2 M minimum distances from both d As we can see from Fig. 4 , after applying rotation to the two BCs, the lattice structure is not fixed, i.e., both the mappings of the symbols and the amplitude of each constellation point on the MCs are different when the rotated angle changes. Moreover, each user randomly uses two different MCs to generate RCR-SCMA codewords. Therefore, the three dimensions of information in the RCR-SCMA codebook are hidden by only performing rotations on the BCs. To sum up, the encryption of the RCR-SCMA is multi-dimensional.
C. UPPER-BOUND-AIDED RCR-SCMA CODEBOOK DESIGN
As noted by [15] , the performance of conventional SCMA is dominated by the codebook design, specifically, by the rotated angle of the BCs. As we have mentioned, our approach may affect the error rate performance. Therefore, it is necessary to study the upper bound of our scheme.
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Bao et al. [25] found that the average symbol error rate (SER) of user j in SCMA can be tightly upper bounded by:
where M is the size of the constellation, and J is the number of users. P{X c → X d } is the pairwise error probability (PEP), which can be further upper bounded by:
A tight upper bound over the Rayleigh fading channel can be found when N = 2, a 1 = 3 . Note that N 0 is the noise variance, and λ 2 k is the kth dimension-wise distance for the SCMA, which is defined as: According to [25] , (8) and (9) are good estimations of the SCMA error rate. However, the calculation of (8) is computationally expensive, especially when the number of users is large. Hence, a simple method to estimate the performance of the encrypted codebook is necessary to adapt our secure transmission scheme. As shown in (9), the error rate performance of SCMA is strongly influenced by λ 2 k . The larger the λ 2 k is, the lower the error rate will be. Furthermore, λ 2 k is entirely depending on the codebook, as shown in (10). Therefore, λ 2 k is an important parameter to estimate the performance of the codebook.
To apply this upper bound to our secure scheme to minimize the performance loss with the smallest possible computational complexity, we define a reference codebook whose kth dimension-wise distance is denoted as λ 2 k,ref .
Moreover, we define a ratio ψ that is related to the PEP of the reference codebook and candidate encrypted codebook:
where a i and b i are the same for both the reference and candidate encrypted codebooks. These two paramters can be regarded as constants in the reference codebook. After some simplification and rearrangement, (11) can be rewritten as:
where
. Note that it can be regarded as a constant when the SNR is fixed. p ref is a constant that is related to the reference codebook. We aim to estimate the relative performance of a candidate codebook. Without loss of generality, we consider the simplest case with only two users in the calculation of the PEP. 3 Based on (12), ψ can be regarded as a function of c k ; hence, the upper bound of PEP can be decomposed into the summation of two parts as:
These two parts in the above formula have the same monotonicity; therefore, we only have to calculate one of them. Consequently, we can obtain the reference ratio ψ ref :
Although the actual SER relationship between candidate codebook and reference codebook cannot be obtained using (14) , it can reflect the performance of a candidate codebook relative to a reference codebook. In this paper, we consider the conventional Tanner graph with 4 chips and 6 users. The codebook in [15] is chosen as the reference codebook; hence, the denominator of (14) can be calculated directly. For 4-point and 16-point SCMA codebooks, we have:
Where ψ ref , 4 and ψ ref , 16 are the reference ratio for 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA codebook, respectively. Note that (15) and (16) are both obtained at E b /N 0 =18 dB over a Rayleigh fading channel. This is related to the fact that the upper bound is sufficiently tight at high E b /N 0 , as reported in [25] ; hence, the estimation is accurate. Obviously, ψ ref > 0 when ψ ref ∈ (0, 1), and we can infer that the performance of the candidate codebook is better than that of the reference codebook. The candidate codebook has a worse performance when ψ ref ∈ (1, ∞). When the SNR is high, which indicates that c k 1, we can make an approximation that is strictly larger than the original ψ:
Furthermore, from (17), we can also obtain:
According to (17) and (18), the candidate codebook can achieve the same performance as the reference codebook
and N 0 = (log 2 M · 10 E b /N 0 10 ) −1 . Therefore, the increment of E b /N 0 required to achieve the same performance as that of the reference codebook can be written as:
It is noted that (19) is a good approximation when the SNR is within the region of high values. Therefore, we can estimate the performance loss between the reference codebook and the candidate encrypted codebook. This conclusion can be extended to the case of multiple users; however, it should be noted that the performance loss calculated by (19) 25 . To obtain a high success rate, we choose a relatively high ψ ref in this paper to achieve better trade-off between the success rate and the codebooks' performance. As for 4-point RCR-SCMA, ψ ref is chosen to be 1.05, and the performance loss relative to the reference codebook is only 0.053 dB according to (19) . For 16-point RCR-SCMA, we choose ψ ref = 1.5. After simulation and calculation, the success rate and performance loss are 92.56% and 0.44 dB, respectively.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR DOWNLINK SCMA
The process of downlink RCR-SCMA is presented in this section.
A. CHANNEL PHASE ESTIMATION
Without loss of generality, we consider a downlink channel where a BS is communicating with J users. First, the activated LUs use the reference codebook to transmit the communication requests to the BS simultaneously. We assume that the BS has knowledge of the CSI. In general, the channel matrix received by BS can be written as:
It is clear that the BS can extract at most K channel phases from each LU because a K -dimensional SCMA codeword is used. The worst case is that the eavesdropper can intercept the training bits. Under these circumstances, the CSI between the eavesdropper and the LUs can be fully estimated. However, the main channel vector h j is still unknown to the eavesdropper as all the channels are independent.
B. ROTATING THE CONSTELLTION RANDOMLY
Secondly, after the channel matrix is estimated, the BS selects enough elements from H to construct an RCR-SCMA codebook. As a result, the encrypted codebook can be generated by the method proposed in Section III-B.
It should be noted that a mapping between the index of the selected h k,j and the constellation points on the BC, which is unknown to the eavesdropper, has to be determined previously. We calculate the parameter ψ ref according to (15) and (16) when the encrypted codebook is designed. When ψ ref ∈ (0, 1.05) and ψ ref ∈ (0, 1.5) for 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA, respectively, the constructed codebook can be used in the secure transmission. If these conditions are not satisfied, it is necessary to adjust the angles and retransmit the training bits to obtain a new channel matrix. Note that if the number of selected channel phases 8 > c p ≥ 4, the appointed mapping between the index of h k,j and the constellation points which is pre-defined on the two BCs should be different because the number of selected h k,j is not sufficient to rotate two BCs with different angles.
The BS performs the RCR and other computations, such as the calculation of λ 2 k and ψ ref , locally and quietly. These operations do not radiate any signals; hence, the eavesdroppers cannot intercept any information from the BS.
C. SELECTED CHANNEL PHASE BROADCASTING
Third, when the RCR process is finished, the BS broadcasts the selected channel phase to all the terminals with a symbol rotation according to the current CSI, which can be written as:
where s rot,j and s j are the rotated symbol and original symbol, respectively. h k,j is the kth component of h j . Hence, the jth LUs can recover the h j based on the rotated signals with an inverse rotation. We assume that the channel is correctly estimated. It should be noted that the BS should broadcast the signals within the coherence interval.
After receiving the signals broadcasted by the BS, LU j can recover the encrypted codebook. We note that all the terminals, including the eavesdropper, can receive the signals containing selected channel phase.
We consider the worst case where the eavesdropper is able to receive the broadcasted signal perfectly. Moreover, it can also estimate the CSI between itself and the BS. However, the eavesdropper still cannot extract any information about the secret key, as clarified in the channel phase estimation process.
D. TRANSMITTED INFORMATION RECOVERY
Finally, the BS sends the information encrypted by RCR-SCMA codebook to the LUs, as shown in Fig. 1 . According to (3) , each user recovers the information bits by the encrypted codebook and MPA. To further enhance the security, the secret key should change over time by transmitting training bits to obtain a new channel matrix.
When transmitting information from the BS to LUs, we assume that the eavesdroppers can receive superposed signals and apply MPA to detect the information. However, no information can be recovered because E in (4) is unknown to the eavesdropper. Considering the worst case where even the mapping between h k,j and the constellation points on the BC is intercepted by eavesdroppers, the eavesdropper can hardly intercept the transmitted information. This is related to the following facts: (1) The data are transmitted out of the coherence interval, and the CSI between the BS and LUs is not fixed. Hence, the eavesdroppers can only apply exhaustive search on secret keys or information. (2) The computational complexity of MPA is dominated by O(M d c ) , so the cost of exhaustive search is extremely high, especially in largescale networks. (3) The encrypted codebook changes over time; hence, a data packet is transmitted by many encrypted codebooks as sufficient channel phases can be extracted before communicating. Therefore, eavesdroppers can hardly intercept any useful data.
V. DISCUSSION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
The Monte Carlo simulation of the error rate performance of RCR-SCMA is reported in this section, along with a theoretical discussion and analysis.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE INSECURE ROTATED ANGLE
As noted in [27] and [28] , the error rate performance can be used to assess the security of a system. According to (4), MPA is based on the Euclidean distance between a superposed signal and its corresponding codewords in the codebook. Based on this information, it can be inferred that the eavesdropper can recover partial information with deviated rotated angles rather than the completely accurate angles in a conventional SCMA system, even though the codebook is unknown to the eavesdropper. Therefore, to illustrate that our scheme is superior to the conventional one, it is necessary to analyze the security of the LUs when the eavesdroppers apply exhaustive search to find the correct conventional codebook. Fig . 5 shows the BER performance of eavesdroppers versus the deviation of the actual rotated angle for different E b /N 0 in an uncoded conventional SCMA system over the SUI-3 channel. The BER curves are monotonically increasing, which indicates that the eavesdropper can intercept information if it can guess the rotated angle within a range. We denote this range as the insecure rotated angle (IRA) for the LUs, which can be defined as:
where P is the BER that the eavesdropper uses a deviated codebook to detect, and p represents a threshold of P, which is unacceptable for the LUs. C denotes the transmitted codebook corresponding to the rotation matrix R i . G is an operator that transforms a conventional codebook into a deviated one. In this paper, we consider that the R i satisfying (22) is the IRA. As shown in Fig. 5 , if p = 0.1, then the maximum deviation of the rotated angle is 10 degrees. As for conventional codebook design, the effect of IRA will be significant because a unitary rotation is applied. In other words, even though the conventional codebook is unknown to the eavesdropper, the search space to decrypt the conventional codebook shrinks due to the IRA. In RCR-SCMA, the IRA has a small effect on the secrecy performance because a randomized rotation is applied to each point of the BC.
In addition, when E b /N 0 is high, the BER rapidly converges to a high value as the deviation of angle increases; however, when E b /N 0 is low, the degradation of the BER performance is not sensitive to the deviation of the actual rotated angle. In other words, as E b /N 0 increases, the BER performance deteriorates more rapidly. This observation is a reminder that the range of IRA decreases at low E b /N 0 .
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Nonetheless, the eavesdroppers can analyze the actual codebook due to the significant variation of BER, even though the codebook slightly deviates at high E b /N 0 in a conventional SCMA system. Furthermore, we also investigate the IRA theoretically. Considering the Euclidean distance between received signals and corresponding codebooks, which is the initial message in MPA processing, clearly, the BER is strongly related to the initial message. If the constellation does not deviate at the receiver, we have:
Where c and h are the vector form of SCMA codeword and its corresponding CSI, respectively. Once the constellation at the transmitter is rotated, we can model the deviated angle as an error term on c at the receiver, which can be written as:
Therefore, the impact of asymmetry knowledge of the codebook can be modeled as:
Note that although |d −d| does not equal to the error rate, it reflects the tendency of the error rate. For simplicity, (25) can be written as:
By applying the norm-inequality on (26), we have:
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality can be applied on (27) :
Therefore,
where y j k σ 2 is related to the signal-to-noise ratio, and
can be regarded as a constant after the superposed signals are received. Hence, (29) can be rewritten as:
where c is a constant, and SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio, which is an exponential function. Hence, the SNR is a dominant factor when it is sufficiently large, i.e., even a small deviation of the angle has a significant impact on | d|. If the SNR is small, the variation of | d| mainly depends on the factor x . As we can see, the tendency of our theoretical result is the same as that of the simulation result shown in Fig. 5, i. e., the degradation of BER is faster at high E b /N 0 . As the constant c is related to the channel gain h, it can be inferred that the IRA will decrease when h is large. It should be stressed out again that the result shown in (30) is an approximation of the impact of IRA, it only reflects the error rate tendency when using a deviated conventional SCMA codebook to detect the received signal.
According to the results, we can conclude that the eavesdropper can obtain partial information when the unitary rotated angle is within the IRA region. Therefore, the security of conventional SCMA is poor due to the existence of the IRA. The analysis also shows that the IRA is related to the CSI.
B. IMPACT OF IMPERFECT CHANNEL ESTIMATION
From the above discussion, we assume that both the BS and LUs have the knowledge about channel phase exactly. However, estimation error cannot be avoided in real systems. Therefore, the analysis of imperfect estimation is necessary to verify the impact of the BER performance on the LUs.
We assume that the CSI estimation of the BS is correct when the LUs transmit training bits. Therefore, the BS can extract the angles as follows:
where θ and h are the actual angle and channel gain, respectively. and are the real and imaginary parts of a complex number, respectively. However, when the BS broadcasts signals containing rotated channel phases, the LUs may estimate the channel with error and cannot recover the rotated angles perfectly. The estimated error of channel can be modeled as:
whereĥ and h are the estimated CSI and actual CSI, respectively. h denotes the error of the CSI estimation, which we model as a random variable that follows the complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, σ 2 ) according to [29] . Note that the CSI is still assumed to be unchanged within the coherence interval; the error is only caused by imperfect estimation. Thus, the estimated angle can be written as:
We aim to obtain a simple formula to determine the impact of estimation error on the rotated angles. Consider the increment between θ andθ :
According to the characteristics of the arctan function, (34) can be written as:
5056 VOLUME 6, 2018 After doing some algebra, we obtain:
.
(36)
When [ h] [h] and [ h]
[h], we can make following approximation:
Furthermore, we can obtain an upper bound of θ :
(38) reflects the impact of imperfect channel estimation on the possible rotated angle. An important observation in (38) is that the estimation error of CSI has a slight impact on the rotated angle, especially when the modulus of h is low. We adopt SUI-3 as the channel model with E b /N 0 =14 dB, 16 dB and 18 dB for both uncoded 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA. The variance of h is normalized to 1 in the simulations, and each component of h j has different estimation error. As shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , we find that the impact of the estimation error on BER is not significant for both the 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA at low variance of h, which can also be explained by (38). Additionally, the estimation error results in more significant degradation on BER for 16-point RCR-SCMA while the BER of 4-point RCR-SCMA remains stable for all simulated variances of h. Therefore, RCR-SCMA is robust against the estimation error of the channel phase. This conclusion is meaningful for the actual implementation because the rotated angles are extracted from the channel.
It should be noted that the deviation caused by the estimation error of the CSI at the LUs' receiver may result in variation of the symbol mapping on the MCs. Taking the 4-point RCR-SCMA as an example, we show a possible case where the mapping of symbols on the MC is affected by the estimation error in Fig. 8 . As shown in the figure, if the MC is constructed without error, then d
y . However, because estimation error exists, we find thatd
in reality. Therefore, one of the MCs is different from the original one with respect to both amplitude and mapping of symbols, which results in error rate performance loss. A similar analysis can be applied to the 16-point RCR-SCMA. According to the simulation results shown in Table 2 , if the estimation error changes the mapping of symbols on the MC, the LUs cannot receive any information. In this case, the CSI estimation error significantly influences the reliability. Hence, we can conclude that the error rate performance of LUs mainly depends on the mapping of symbols on MCs when the user cannot estimate the CSI correctly to recover the codebook used by the BS.
C. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The error rate performance of downlink SCMA systems (including parameters K = 4; J = 6; d c = 3; d u = 2; max(N iter ) = 6; λ = 150%) is evaluated over the SUI-3 channel. The SCMA indicator matrix F 4×6 in formula (1) with M = 4 and M = 16 are utilized for the simulations. The reference codebook is designed according to [15] . In this subsection, we assume that both the LUs and eavesdroppers can obtain correct knowledge of the CSI. Binary LDPC code with length N = 256 and rate r = 0.5 is used as the channel code.
Error rate comparisons of the first user for 4-point and 16-point downlink RCR-SCMA and conventional SCMA are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . Because the rotated angles are random, the RCR-SCMA performance varies. The performance of RCR-SCMA with secret key-1 is slightly worse than that of conventional SCMA. The performance loss is acceptable due to the introduction of the upper-bound-related parameter ψ ref . Moreover, RCR-SCMA performs even better than conventional SCMA under some circumstances. This phenomenon can be explained by the proposed upper-boundaided codebook design scheme and Table 1 , namely, the actual ψ ref of a candidate codebook can be less than 1. Furthermore, it is clear that eavesdroppers cannot obtain any information.
In Figs. 11 and 12 , we illustrate the feasibility of our scheme to ensure the security of different users. As shown in the figures, the gap between the best user and the worst user is nearly 0.8 dB and 1 dB at a BER of 10 −4 for 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA, respectively. The CSI of the BS and LUs are different. resulting in the performance gap. However, each user uses independent CSI to recover the information transmitted from the BS and has nearly the same BER performance. Therefore, the security and reliability of each user in the network can both be guaranteed by using RCR-SCMA.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF RCR-SCMA
The security of RCR-SCMA will be discussed from two aspects in this section.
A. THE DECRYPTED COMPLEXITY OF RCR-SCMA
The decrypted complexity for an eavesdropper is an important factor to measure the secrecy performance. In this subsection, we focus on analyzing the decrypted complexity when an exhaustive search is applied to searching for the 5058 VOLUME 6, 2018 correct codebook for both RCR-SCMA and conventional SCMA.
Considering the characteristics of a downlink SCMA system, the eavesdropper can only receive the superposed signals of all active LUs; hence, the MPA should be utilized to detect the data. We first discuss the SCMA codebook designed in the conventional way. We assume that the codebook is unknown to the eavesdropper; however, the design rule of the conventional SCMA codebook is known to the eavesdropper. Therefore, an exhaustive search for the rotated angle of the BC can be used to recover the transmitted data. We set the step size in the search as degree; then, the eavesdropper needs at most 360 detection attempts to obtain the codebook, regardless of the IRA. Furthermore, the conventional codebook is fixed in an SCMA system; hence, the eavesdropper can receive sufficient signals and decrypt the data by searching for the correct codebook. After the codebook is decrypted, all the messages transmitted between the LUs and BS will be intercepted by the eavesdropper. Therefore, the security of conventional SCMA is poor.
According to Section II, the process of RCR-SCMA codebook design can be summarized as Algorithm 2.
After the CSI is estimated, K channel phases are obtained from each LU because K -dimensional SCMA codewords are utilized. The decrypted complexity is related to the number of used channel phases, namely c p , that selecting from H. To evaluate the search space of 16-point RCR-SCMA, we have to consider the following three cases:
1) c p = 4: In this case, only 4 h k,j are extracted from the channel. Hence, we need to apply different mappings between the index of h k,j and the two BCs in this case. Under these circumstances, once the eavesdropper can recover one of the rotated BCs, then only 4! (where ''!'' denotes the factorial) extra operations should be used to recover the other BC as the mapping is unknown to the eavesdropper. After the rotated angles are decrypted, there are 
where I T is the number of iterations. Based on (39) and the above discussions, the decrypted complexity comparison of conventional SCMA and RCR-SCMA is presented in Table 3 .
As shown in Table 3 , the complexity required to steal the conventional codebook by means of exhaustive search is very low compared with RCR-SCMA. Moreover, the conventional codebook is fixed; hence, once the codebook is decrypted, an eavesdropper can recover the transmitted data, as the LUs do.
Taking the simplest RCR-SCMA system with K = 4, J = 6, d u = 3, d c = 2 and max(I T ) = 6 as an example, an eavesdropper requires approximately 10 11.8−2 lg and 10 16.6−2 lg operations to search for all possible 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA codebooks, respectively, for a block. It should be noted that if the eavesdroppers want to recover data with high accuracy, should be less than 1. Therefore, the security of conventional SCMA, from the secret key decrypted perspective, is very weak compare to that of RCR-SCMA.
Although the decrypted complexity is not sufficiently high to ensure the perfect security of secret keys, we will determine the infeasibility to intercept data via brute force attack on secret keys in the next subsection.
B. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE ATTACK METHODS

1) POST-PROCESSING ATTACK
Post-processing attack is similar to brute force search attack on secret keys in conventional security systems. Nonetheless, a post-processing attacker is assumed to be unbounded in time and storage capacity [31] . Hence, the eavesdroppers can store all the signals received from the BC.
As mentioned in Section IV, each RCR-SCMA codebook encrypted by an independent channel phase is used to transmit several bits (a block or several blocks) in a data packet. To illustrate that RCR-SCMA is immune to postprocessing attack, we detect one block for a LU by employing exhaustive search on all possible codebooks in a 16-point RCR-SCMA system. Fig. 13 depicts the proportion of codebooks that result in different numbers of error bits in a block for different E b /N 0 .
In Fig. 13 , we can observe that approximately 6% of the codebooks can recover the original block without any errors for all E b /N 0 . Moreover, more than 25% of the codebooks can recover the original block with only one error bit. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot even judge whether the decrypted codebook they use is correct by analyzing the recovered information bits. Additionally, the proportion is weakly related to the channel E b /N 0 . Therefore, the correct codebook is hardly decrypted under any E b /N 0 . According to the above discussions, the eavesdropper can only apply brute force search on information bits. However, the complexity will be extremely high even though a post-processing eavesdropper can store all the transmitted signals.
2) INTELLIGENT ATTACK
In contrast to a brute force attack or post-processing attack, an intelligent attacker has the ability to estimate the CSI between the BS and LUs with certain accuracy [32] . Such an attacker model is similar to the analysis shown in Section V-B. If an intelligent attacker is able to guess the rotated angles of each BC with very high accuracy, the encrypted codebook can be decrypted, according to Section V-B. Although the previous appointed mappings between constellation points on the BC and the index of vector h j are unknown, it is easy to obtain the mappings via exhaustive search because they are fixed. However, we have noted another case that results in a high error rate in Section V-B, namely, the variation of symbol mappings on MCs due to the estimation error.
By combining these two cases, the error rate performance of an intelligent eavesdropper is plotted versus the maximum deviation of the angle ( θ max ) caused by approximation error at the eavesdropper's side in Fig. 14 . We test 10 6 codebooks obtained by randomly deviating each point on the BC with an angle less than θ max . It should be noted that the possible variation of the symbol mappings on the MCs should be taken into consideration in our simulation. The other parameters are the same as in Section V-C.
As depicted in Fig. 14 , for all E b /N 0 , the error rate of the eavesdropper increases as the maximum estimation error increases. In addition, the gap between BER and BLER gradually decreases as E b /N 0 increases. For low E b /N 0 , the error rate is sufficiently high to protect confidential information. Nonetheless, partial information may be intercepted at high E b /N 0 because the impact of estimation error weakens. Therefore, even though the intelligent attacker is powerful enough to estimate the CSI and guess the rotated angles, the eavesdropper can still hardly intercept useful data from the BS if estimation error out of certain range.
Furthermore, our proposed scheme is immune to intelligent attackers under certain conditions. We intend to determine the range of angles that can result in variation of the symbol map on the MC. For simplicity, we only discuss the variation caused by the x coordinate; the discussion of the y coordinate is similar. According to the notation in (5), the variation of the symbol mappings on the MC for a 16-point RCR-SCMA can be represented as:
where x p and x q are the original x coordinates of points p and q on the BC, respectively. X p and X q are the estimated x coordinates of an eavesdropper of points p and q, respectively. As variation of symbol mappings on the MC is most likely to occur when the x coordinates of points p and q are close, we assume that |x p − x q | is the minimum value on the BC. Based on (40), the possible variation of symbol mapping when designing a codebook can be regarded as the variation of coordinates caused by the estimated error. Therefore, the range of deviated angle θ that can cause variation of symbol mapping on the MC is:
For proof, see Appendix A.
C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION
According to the previous discussion, we can conclude that the security of RCR-SCMA is based on the following three factors: (1) The rotated angles are obtained from the estimated CSI; hence, the codebook cannot be obtained by an eavesdropper. (2) Once the BS receive a request to communicate from the LUs, new encrypted codebooks can be generated to transmit several blocks in a data packet; hence, the eavesdropper cannot verify the validity of a codebook by analyzing the detected bits. (3) The decrypted complexity for a block is very high when searching for a possible codebook. Therefore, the transmitted data can hardly be intercepted if the eavesdropper wants to recover the data packet by searching for all possible codebooks in real time.
As mentioned above, the ideal situation is that each block in a data packet is encrypted with a different RCR-SCMA codebook. Considering the extra uplink of training bits transmission, CSI estimation and parameter calculations, the transmission rate is sacrificed to improve security. Therefore, to decrease the delay of our scheme without loss of secrecy performance, several blocks can be grouped to be transmitted with one codebook in practical systems.
In practical applications of SCMA, such as IoT networks in mMTC, where strong ciphers such as advanced encryption standard (AES) are too costly computationally, the proposed security scheme operates over the physical layer of the protocol stack and can be viewed as the first step towards a somewhat unconventional bottom-up architecture for secure communications. It can be combined with lightweight ciphers over higher layers to decrease the complexity while ensuring sufficient levels of confidentiality. To break the cipher, the eavesdropper would have to guess both the key and the random rotated angles introduced by the CSI, which leads to a significant increase in the search space when performing cryptanalysis. The combination of secure communication over the physical layer and powerful cryptographic technologies has been studied in [33] - [35] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a novel secure transmission scheme for a downlink SCMA system over the physical layer, namely, RCR-SCMA. RCR-SCMA employs the technique of channel key extraction to scramble the codebook at the transmitter to make it unknown to the eavesdropper. To minimize the performance loss caused by RCR, we introduced a tight error rate upper bound for conventional SCMA to guide the design of the encrypted codebook. The simulation results confirmed the feasibility of our scheme. Furthermore, we discussed the IRA and the impact of imperfect CSI estimation in an RCR-SCMA system. The analysis showed that the secrecy performance of conventional SCMA is related to IRA and that RCR-SCMA is relatively robust to channel estimation error under certain condition. Additionally, we calculated the decrypted complexity of RCR-SCMA and analyzed the secrecy performance of RCR-SCMA under two different attacker models. In conclusion, our scheme can be used as a valuable supplement to conventional cryptographic technologies.
APPENDIX Derivation of (41)
For simplicity, we assume the impact of the estimation error on the intelligent eavesdropper is the same. Then, the rotation VOLUME 6, 2018 matrices of points p and q can be represented as:
Therefore, we can obtain:
X p = x p · cos( θ ) + y p · sin( θ) (43) X q = x q · cos( θ ) + y q · sin( θ)
According to (41), we have:
x p · cos( θ ) + y p · sin( θ) < x q · cos( θ ) + y q · sin( θ )
After rearrangement, (45) can be written as:
As (x p , y p ) and (x q , y q ) are the original coordinates of points p and q and, without loss of generality, we assume x 2 p + y 2 p = x 2 q + y 2 q = 1, (46) can be rewritten as:
